for the first time ever.
1 Some of these analysts also predicted that $100 per barrel crude oil would cause the U.S. economy to fall into a recession.
Conventional economic theory suggests that higher oil prices lead to a reduced rate of growth in aggregate economic activity in the short run. 2 Empirically, the largest adverse effects have stemmed from the oil shocks that occurred prior to 1983. Consistent with this view, this article finds that the growth rates of several key economic indicators, and their measured volatility, are distinctly different before and after the six major oil shocks that have occurred since 1973. However, non-oil factors also appear to be significant explanatory factors in the performance of the economy before and after 1973.
Using an augmented model proposed by Hamilton (2003) , this article will show that a permanent increase in the spot price of crude oil to either $100 or $150 per barrel would cause a substantial slowing in real GDP growth and its major components relative to a baseline forecast without oil prices. Given the relatively weak growth projected over the first half of 2008, this result could be significant. However, such an increase in oil prices 1 See Greenspan (2007) , King and Chazan (2007) , and Verleger (2007) . 2 Using a static aggregate demand-aggregate supply model, an increase in energy prices causes the aggregate supply curve to shift up along a stationary aggregate demand curve. Over time, though, the economy returns to its long-run level of potential output.
is shown to have little or no effect on future inflation rates relative to a baseline forecast without oil prices.
OIL AND MACROECONOMIC ACTIVITY: THE THEORY AND EVIDENCE
Oil shocks tend to be viewed with alarm by forecasters, macroeconomists, financial market participants, and public policymakers. 3 An oil price shock is typically a large, unexpected increase in the relative price of energy that adversely affects the economic decisions of firms and households. 4 These effects are both direct and indirect (second-order effects) and vary in magnitude across time. To begin with, higher crude oil prices directly raise the prices of petroleum-based products such as gasoline or diesel fuel. Because crude oil is an important energy source for most industrialized or industrializing countries, there can also be important pass-through (secondary) effects to the prices of non-energy goods and services. These include fuel surcharges implemented by those in the transportation services industry (e.g., FedEx or UPS).
At the same time, the duration of these economic effects varies with its permanence and with the passage of time. In the short-run, the price elasticities of the supply and demand for oil is likely very low because firms and consumers may find it difficult to change their consumption immediately and new sources of oil or alternative sources of energy are not immediately available. Over the longer term, these price elasticities will likely be larger. Higher prices spur producers to seek out new sources of crude oil, but they also provide important incentives to increase the production of alternative energy sources, such as ethanol or bio-diesel. Higher oil prices also prompt users to conserve energy.
Most oil price shocks are the result of reductions in supply arising from wars, embargoes, or geopolitical uncertainty tied to developments in important oil-producing regions. However, the latest rise in oil prices appears to be stem importantly from fastgrowing Asian countries. Regardless, as seen in Figure 1 , nearly all post-World War II recessions in the United States were preceded by, or accompanied by, an increase in oil prices. The behavior of oil prices, though, was decidedly different before the 1970s.
5
According to Hamilton (1985) , changes in U.S. crude oil prices prior to the 1970s were largely the result of exogenous shocks. Rasche and Tatom (1977a, 1977b) and Baily (1981) were among the first to study the transmission mechanism between oil price changes and real GDP 5 Hamilton (2005) argues that the size of the oil price shock can be measured in either real or nominal terms, but most researchers prefer to use nominal prices. 6 Though not shown, this is in contrast with the reduced volatility of aggregate output and inflation that is often termed "The Great Moderation." 7 This section has been adapted from Guo and Kliesen (2005) .
growth. Subsequently, Hamilton (1983) , among many others, documented a negative and significant relation between oil price changes and future GDP growth. But as Hooker (1996) showed, this result breaks down in the data after 1986. In 1986, recall, there was a sharp, unexpected decline in oil prices. In Hamilton's original linear specification, he implicitly assumed that oil shocks had a symmetric effect on economic activity: Increases (decreases) in oil prices reduce (raise) future GDP growth. This specification is consistent with the transmission channel cited in the early studies mentioned above and those of a more recent vintage, such as Wei (2003) . However, the effect can be also asymmetric. To account for nonlinearities in the data, Hamilton (2003) proposed a net oil price increase variable. In this specification, oil price increases influence economic activity, such as the growth of real GDP, but oil price decreases do not (more on this variable later).
An oil price increase may lower future GDP growth through other channels. In particular, sharp oil price changes-either increases or decreases-affect macroeconomic activity for at least two reasons. First, they raise uncertainty about future oil prices and thus cause delays in business investment (e.g., Bernanke [1983] and Pindyck [1991] ). Guo and Kliesen (2005) , for example, find that increased oil volatility over the period from 1984 to 2004 had a significant and adverse effect on key measures of U.S.
macroeconomic activity, such as business capital spending. Second, oil price changes induce resource reallocation from more adversely affected sectors to less adversely affected sectors, and such reallocation is costly (e.g., Lilien [1982] , Davis and Haltiwanger [2001] , and Lee and Ni [2002] ).
The link between oil price changes and economic activity is complicated by other factors, such as the physical demand for the product, which to some degree is influenced by economic growth, and the influence of domestic monetary policymakers. According to Barsky and Kilian (2004) , the linkage between higher oil prices and weaker economic growth is complicated by the endogeneity of oil prices. This view holds that demand shocks, rather than supply shocks have been the dominant factors explaining higher oil prices. In a subsequent paper, Kilian (2007) asserts that precautionary demand shocks, which he defines as expectations about future oil supplies, have also been important.
Another view, expressed by Bernanke, Gertler, and Watson (1997) , holds that the dominant cause of recessions was not due to the sharp rise in oil prices but rather to the endogenous response of monetary policymakers. 8 Other studies examining the interaction between monetary policy and oil price shocks include Leduc and Sill (2004) and Hamilton and Herrera (2004) . The modest tilt toward a more restrictive monetary policy may help explain why both measures of long-term inflation expectations were little changed (on average) over this period. Despite sharply higher oil prices over the past six years, long-term forecasts for labor productivity and real GDP growth have increased slightly.
OIL AND THE MACROECONOMY SINCE 2001
Estimates of the short-run macroeconomic effects of higher oil prices on real GDP growth vary. According to a recent survey of several macroeconomic models reported by 
Economic Activity Before and After Oil Shocks
Dating oil price shocks tends to be a subjective endeavor. Blanchard and Gali This method produces six oil shock dates : 1973, 1979, 1989, 1995,1999, and 2002 . These are shown in Figure 2 . 14 To see how economic performance around these six major oil shocks has changed over time, Table 2 shows economic volatility for several 12 The IMF used the average price of U.K. Brent, Dubai, and WTI. In November 2000, this reference price averaged about $32 per barrel according to the IMF. 13 The cumulative (12-month) percent change over this period was more than 1,800 percent, but that is not an important consideration in this framework. 14 Four of the oil shock dates in Figure 2 match Blanchard's and Gali's dates: 1973, 1979, 1999, and 2002. major series four quarters before and after these episodes. The first five series listed in Table 2 are major measures of output and expenditures. The next four series measure CPI-and PCE-based overall inflation and inflation excluding food and energy prices (core inflation). The next three series measure labor markets and consumer confidence, and the final three series measure short-and long-term interest rates and the real spot price of WTI crude oil. Economic volatility was generally quite high during the four quarters immediately before and after the first two oil shocks (1973 and 1979) . For example, the standard deviation of real GDP growth during the four quarters before the 1979 oil shock (1979:Q2) was nearly 7 percentage points; output volatility fell modestly in the immediate aftermath of the oil shock (4.9 percentage points) but still remained quite high. By contrast, the volatility of GDP prior to the latest oil shock dropped to less than 2 percentage points. In general, oil shocks cause outlays for capital goods to be much more volatile than household expenditures on goods and services.
Table 2 also reveals that economic volatility appears to have increased in the period both immediately before and after the past two oil shocks (1999 and 2002) . For example, volatility of overall PCE and CPI inflation has increased, as has the volatility of core CPI inflation. One notable exception is the volatility of core PCE inflation. Although the increased volatility prior to the 2002 oil price shock was the largest since the 1979 oil shock, the volatility of core PCE inflation in the four quarters following the shock has been quite low (0.29 percentage points). 
The Effects of Oil Price Changes on Output and Inflation Since 1970
To get a rough idea of the potential effects of higher oil prices on real GDP growth and inflation, one can employ the simple model used by Hamilton (2003) :
Hamilton originally used the log change in real GDP (not an annual rate), y t . In this analysis, though, y t will be a measure of the log change in real GDP at an annual rate.
The oil price change, x t , is the price of crude oil transformed according to Hamilton (2003) . 15 Hamilton showed that an asymmetric measure of oil prices helps explain real GDP growth. He also showed that the sum of the coefficients on the lagged values of the net oil price (NOP) measure were highly significant, even though some of the individual coefficients were not. Hamilton's measure of the NOP is constructed in the following way: The current-quarter percentage difference (taken to be the observation in the last month of the quarter; for example, March, June, September, December) is compared with the maximum price over the past 12 quarters. If the percentage difference is positive, that observation is used, but if the percentage difference is negative, that month's observation is set to zero. Thus, in the Hamilton framework, only energy price increases matter; energy price decreases do not matter. Table 3 Regression (1) in Table 3 reports results from a model that predicts future real GDP growth using lagged growth rates. Although this simple AR(4) model is commonly used to predict future GDP growth, the adjusted R 2 is quite low, 0.06. Regression (2) 
The Chicago Fed National Activity Index (CFNAI) is the first principle component, or common factor, of 85 monthly indicators of real economic activity.
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Much empirical research has shown that principle components can significantly improve the forecasting performance of major macroeconomic variables such as real GDP growth and inflation. 17 This result is reinforced in regressions (3) and (4) in Table 3 . Adding the contemporaneous and lagged value of the CFNAI (z t and z t-1 ) to both the AR(4) model and Hamilton's equation cited above shows that the CFNAI is highly significant. 18 In addition, the first and second lags of NOP are now highly significant as well. As a result, the explanatory power of regressions (3) and (4) is significantly larger than for regressions (1) and (2).
A further extension of Hamilton's analysis can be seen in Table 4 . In this case, the analysis examines whether the NOP variable helps to predict the growth of real GDPand, separately, its major components-and inflation (log change) using four separate price measures. The inflation series are based on the overall price indexes measured by the consumer price index (CPI) and the personal consumption expenditures (PCE) price index (PCEPI), as well as their respective "core" measures, which exclude food and energy prices. The empirical results reported in Table 4 are based on equation (2) above.
Hence, the GDP expenditure categories and price variables will become, separately, the y t terms. Each row in Table 4 reports the F-test to determine the significance of the sum of the coefficients on oil prices. For example, in the first row y t would be real GDP; in the second row y t would be the growth of real personal consumption expenditures, and so forth. For the reasons noted above, the analysis is based on the period from 1970:Q1 to 2007:Q4. In this case, though, 
Effects on Output
Table 4 reveals that energy price increases significantly help to predict real GDP growth and most of its components. However, the size of this effect varies across indicator and across time. Over the entire sample period the sum of the energy coefficients on real GDP growth was highly significant, though modest (-0.09). 20 The first row of Table 4 indicates that the oil price increases have had their largest effect on real GDP growth over the final period (-0.13). The effects of energy price increases on real GDP growth were much smaller in the second period (-0.06), which is sometimes called The Great Inflation. Over the proceeding period, though, the effect of energy prices on real GDP growth, while still significant, was small (-0.005). Table 4 reveals some other interesting findings. First, during the period of the Great Inflation, oil price increases had their largest (negative) effects on real residential fixed investment and imports; however, the effect on real consumer spending was relatively small during this period. Second, oil price increases generally had their smallest effect on the components of real GDP from 1983 to 1994. The notable exception was real 19 See Anderson and Kliesen (2006) . 20 Excluding the CFNAI, the sum of the coefficients increases (in absolute terms) to -0.19.
consumer spending. Moreover, in the cases of real fixed investment in business equipment and software and real imports, the sign not only changed, but the significance of oil price increases disappeared. Third, since 1995, the sensitivity of real E&S investment has increased significantly. In fact, the coefficient is about equal in magnitude to the second period, but the sign is now changed. In addition, higher oil prices now help to predict business investment in structures. However, this change could reflect the fact that the share of nominal fixed investment in drilling and mining activity as a percent of nominal nonresidential fixed investment has increased from about 1.75 percent in 1995 to 8 percent in 2007. Finally, although the effect of oil price increases on real PCE since 1995 has diminished somewhat compared with the 1983-94 period (from -0.19 to -0.11), the sum of the coefficients are more significant compared with the earlier period.
Effects on Consumer Price Inflation
The last four rows of Table 4 report the results of equation (2) applied to the four price series mentioned above. 21 Since 1970, the sum of the coefficients on oil price increases, which have the expected positive sign and are highly significant, are essentially the same for both the total CPI and the total PCEPI (0.04). But whereas the sums of the coefficients on the core price indexes are also roughly equal to each other, the sums of the coefficients are larger, and even more significant, than for the total price measures. It appears that the latter effect stems from the Great Inflation period. Since 1983, the effects of higher oil prices on core inflation have been much more modest, and considerably 21 A version of Table 3 was estimated for the PCEPI and core PCEPI series. That is, inflation was regressed on (i) four lags of inflation, (ii) four lags of Hamilton's NOP measure, and (iii) the contemporaneous and lagged value of the CFNAI. In results not published here, the adjusted R 2 for PCEPI inflation in (i) is 0.76. Adding the CFNAI increased the adjusted R 2 to 0.78. The adjusted R 2 for the AR(4) for core PCEPI is 0.82, and adding the CFNAI boosted the adjusted R 2 to 0.83. Adding Hamilton's NOP to the latter model raised adjusted R 2 to 0.86. These results are available on request.
smaller than those on the total price measures. The results in Table 4 provide some evidence for the FOMC's decision to place somewhat more emphasis on core PCEPI inflation during the run-up in oil prices over the past several years.
A Forecasting Experiment
Results from Tables 3 and 4 suggest that past oil price increases are statistically significant predictors of economic activity and inflation in the current quarter. This section will provide some evidence that Hamilton's NOP variable helps to forecast the growth of economic activity and inflation one quarter ahead. In this experiment, the baseline forecast uses an AR(4) model augmented with the CFNAI; this is a one-period ahead version of regression (3) in Table 3 . To this restricted model, two energy price series are added separately: (1) the spot price of West Texas Intermediate and (2) the Producer Price Index for domestic crude petroleum (PPI). Each of these oil price series will be modified according to the Hamilton specification throughout the remainder of the paper. First, the restricted model (without energy) is estimated from 1970:Q1 to 2001:Q4.
The model is estimated for each of the output and price series listed in Table 4 . Next, one-step-ahead pseudo-out-of-sample forecasts (with and without energy) are computed from 2002:Q1 to 2007:Q4. Table 5 presents the root mean square errors (RMSE) from this forecasting exercise.
The value of any forecast to the practitioner or the policymaker is its accuracy. A standard test of forecast accuracy is the test proposed by Diebold and Mariano (1995, DM) . However, as Clark and McCracken (2001, CM) point out, the DM test is not appropriate for nested models such as those used here. In Table 5 , the null hypothesis is that the baseline forecasts (without NOP) have the same predictive power. Based on the CM test statistic, Table 5 shows that spot oil price increases can help improve the baseline, one-quarter-ahead forecast for the growth of real GDP, real PCE, and real imports. However, this is not the case for the PPI measure of oil prices. In all other series listed in Table 5 , including the consumer price series, Hamilton's NOP variable does not improve the baseline forecast. In fact, Table 5 reveals that adding the WTI spot oil price increase to the price equations marginally improves the RMSE of the forecasts for overall CPI and PCE inflation. For example, adding the spot WTI to the CPI inflation forecasting equation reduces the RMSE from 2.03 (baseline) to 2.01. Notably, the RMSE for the PCEPI inflation forecasts are much smaller than they are for the CPI series. Table 6 shows these out-of-sample forecasts for annual average growth rates in 2008 and 2009 for real GDP, real PCE, real business fixed Investment (BFI), and PCEPI and core PCEPI inflation. 24 As seen in Table 6 , the baseline forecast for real GDP growth From this analysis, one can assume that an economy starting at 1 percent real GDP growth or less could plausibly end up with significantly negative growth rates in real GDP over the near term should the economy experience another large increase in oil prices. However, once oil prices stabilize, and the drag from higher oil prices ends, the model predicts modest above-trend growth. This is seen in the baseline forecast with $100 per barrel oil.
Forecasts for the remaining variables in Table 6 show that the baseline forecast That is, the model may implicitly assume a Taylor-rule like response by policymakers to prevent higher oil prices from producing higher core inflation.
Conclusion
The analysis in this paper has used Hamilton's augmented model to gauge the effects of higher oil prices on real GDP growth, its major components, and four measures of inflation. The first major finding of the paper, consistent with Hamilton's result, is that oil matters. However, there are certain periods when it matters more or less. The second major finding is that the estimated negative effects of $100 per barrel oil on output 1970.1 -1982.4 1970.1 -2007.4 where z t is the Chicago Fed's National Activity Index, x t is domestic crude petroleum production transformed according to Hamilton (2003) , and y t are the dependent variables above. For the reported p -values, ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
NOTE:
The base forecast is an AR(4) model augmented with the contemporaneous and first lag of the CFNAI; this is regression (3) from Table 3 . The alternative models are augmented with either the spot price of West Texas Intermediate (WTI) or the PPI for domestic crude petroleum production. Both oil prices are transformed according to Hamilton (2003) . The augmented model is regression (4) from 
